(1973): Logics and Languages, Methuen, London. 69(4), 438–453. 490–517. It is useful to have a specific version of an S5 quantificational modal logic at hand, in terms of which this book's philosophical investigations can be carried out. 74, 150–174.
4 Beginnings Chapter 1 13(2), 145–152. Don't already have an Oxford Academic account? Zalta, E. N. (1995): Two (related) world views, Noûs ‘2 + 2 = 4’ stands for a function that yields the truth-value ‘true’ for every world, while ‘Socrates had a snub nose’ stands for a different function that yields ‘true’ for some worlds and ‘false’ for others, depending on what Socrates’ nose is like in the world. © 2020 Informa UK Limited, an Informa Group Company. existence of other (non-actualized) possible worlds. I attempt to steer a course 102, 147–150. Thus, a novel interpretation of applied possible-worlds semantics is offered on which we may lay claim to whatever benefits such a theory offers while avoiding realism about (other) possible worlds.
Vision, G. (1993): Fiction and fictionalist reductions, Pac. Access to the full content is only available to members of institutions that have purchased access. It looks at Saul Kripke's views about how possible worlds are specified, in particular at the role of individuals in specifying possible worlds.
The canonical version of possible worlds semantics for story prefixes is due to David Lewis. such a disastrous applied possible-worlds semantics by noting, and developing, the between commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds and commitment to Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011, DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199246557.001.0001, PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). John Perry. This paper reassesses Lewis's theory and draws attention to some novel problems for his account. (1970a): On three-valued logic, in L. Borkowski (ed. Article 58–75.
), Approaches to Natural Language, D. Reider, Dordrecht, pp. 29(2), 189–211. In the actual world… 7, 67–77.
Possible-worlds semantics was used in interpreting modal notions, like necessity and possibility (alethic modalities), knowledge and belief (epistemic modalities), and obligatory and permitted (deontic modali-ties). endobj
Kripke, S. (1980): Naming and Necessity, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
(From extensions to intensions) Salmon, N. (1998): Nonexistence, Noûs Since these two sentences stand for different things, sentences that have them as constituents, such as (a) and (b), can also stand for different things. This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
You could not be signed in. Possible worlds semantics (PWS) is a family of ideas and methods that have been used to analyse concepts of philosophical interest. PWS was originally focused on the important concepts of necessity and possibility.
Zadeh, L. A. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199246557.003.0002, 5 The Semantics of Classical Predicate Logic, The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic, 5 The Semantics of Classical Predicate Logic. Philosophy Department, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand, You can also search for this author in
Possible worlds semantics have been widely applied both in philosophy and in other fields such as linguistic semantics and pragmatics, theoretical computer science, and game theory. Instead, we will just start working with them and see what they can do for us. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide, This PDF is available to Subscribers Only. 11, 331–344. Herschel, J. F. W. (1851): A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, Longmans & Co., London. Don't already have an Oxford Academic account?
An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. endobj Please check your email address / username and password and try again. All Rights Reserved. 3, Department of Philosophy, Australian National University. benefits such a theory offers while avoiding realism about (other) possible worlds. (Structured intensions) 54, 162–174.
If a possible-worlds semantic theory for modal logics is pure, then the assertion of the Log. Rapaport, W. J. But if we consider an applied theory (an application Australas. endobj (1972): An Introduction to Modal Logic, Methuen & Co., London. Possible worlds semantics (PWS) is a family of ideas and methods that have been used to analyse concepts of philosophical interest. Parsons, T. (1995): Meinongian semantics generalized, Grazer Philos. J Philos Logic 35, 9–40 (2006). constrained to contain only one-world models is bound to deliver results on validity, position of one who asserts such a theory at face-value but who remains agnostic about the Walton, K. L. (1990): Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. worlds, then assertion of such a theory, taken at face-value, does appear to bring Philos. ), Jan Lukasiewicz: Selected Works, North Holland, Amsterdam.
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10, 79–111. If you belong to such an institution, please log in or find out more about how to order.
The development of Kripke semantics … ����k_cd��8��t R��eu֢��+8=�:�o4)��&�Ӑ�@a�#gc@�V�D��5���wg=�w��r�c;P��/xs�-J�$b3��0t|���"�g���on��HS8��`2#�B�J ��h� ��pI��$.�)j�. It has been applied to a number of intensional phenomena in addition to necessity and possibility, including conditionals, tense and temporal adverbs, obligation and reports of informational and cognitive content. 21 0 obj
Step 1: Possible Worlds. For each world, the function yields the truth-value the sentence would have if that world were actual. Crittenden, C. (1982): Fictional characters and logical completeness, Poetics Hale (1995b): A desperate fix, Analysis Cresswell, M. J. It looks at Saul Kripke's views about how possible worlds …
There are many different systems of modal logic, but the type of system that is generally believed to formalise correctly the logical features of this broadly logical sense of necessity is called S5. %PDF-1.4 Lewis, D. (1983): Truth in fiction, in D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Vol. Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958): Pretending, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. This article is also available for rental through DeepDyve. So, for theory, taken at face-value, can bring no commitment to the existence of a plurality of 261–280.
This chapter discusses the general contrast between modal realism and actualism and questions about the kind of explanation that possible worlds provide for modal discourse and modal facts. (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. In his 1975 article “Possible Worlds in Literary Semantics” (further developed in his 1986 book Fictional Worlds), he sees in the concept of PW a way to put an end to … Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 0 obj 70(2), 211–224. Linsky, B. and Zalta, E. N. (1991): Is Lewis a Meinongian? Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter. 8, 11–29. 8, 338–353. 279–294. Rescher, N. and Brandom, R. (1979): The Logic of Inconsistency: A Study in Non-Standard Possible-World Semantics and Ontology, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, NJ. (1993): Truth in fiction: The story continued, Australas. The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality, Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic, Two logical operators for the price of one. . Lewis, D. (1988): Relevant implication, Theoria But although Socrates did in fact have a snub nose, it was not necessary that he did; he might have had a nose of some other shape. This chapter discusses the general contrast between modal realism and actualism and questions about the kind of explanation that possible worlds provide for modal discourse and modal facts. 99, 327–354. Part of Springer Nature.
Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M. J.
<< /S /GoTo /D (section.2) >> Currie, G. (1990): The Nature of Fiction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
53(2), 71–81. endobj
Possible worlds semantics have been widely applied both in philosophy and in other fields such as linguistic semantics and pragmatics, theoretical computer science, and game theory. Schiffer, S. (1996): Language-created language-independent entities, Philos. Please, subscribe or login to access full text content. Zadeh, L. A. Correspondence to But if we consider an applied theory (an applica- Approach, Mind, Volume 115, Issue 458, April 2006, Pages 187–226, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzl187. >> 17 0 obj
28(3), 248–258.
58(2), 72–75. Possible worlds semantics: A research program ... 381 becomes a complex formula with one free world parameter, denoting the set of worlds in which p holds.
Q. contact us PWS has inspired analyses of many concepts of philosophical importance, and the concept of a possible world has been at the heart of important philosophical systems. The Aristotelian interpretation of (aletic) modalities was the so- Kripke thinks that the "distant planets" picture of possible worlds contributes to the illusion that there is a problem about the identification of individuals across possible worlds, and that is one of his main reasons for thinking that the modal realist doctrine is a pernicious one.
Kripke, S. (1973): Shearman Lectures delivered at University College London.
Consider: Intuitively, (a) is true but (b) is false. Top.
A large part of the attraction of modal realism is that it purports to provide a genuine eliminative reduction of modality. Thereby, the contention that applied possible-worlds semantics gives us reason to be realists about possible worlds is (further) undermined.
Wolterstorff, N. (1980): Works and Worlds of Art, Oxford University Press, Oxford. ), Jan Lukasiewicz: Selected Works, North Holland, Amsterdam. << /S /GoTo /D [22 0 R /Fit ] >> PWS takes a sentence to stand for a function from worlds to truth-values. Lewis gave a variety of arguments fo… Baldwin, T. (1998): Modal fictionalism and the imagination, Analysis
There is simply no way that 2 and 2 can add up to anything but 4, so (a) is true. Most users should sign in with their email address. This is the guiding idea of possible worlds semantics.
Van Inwagen, P. (1983): Fiction and existence, Philos.
stream 64, 160–180. Stud. 87(3), 259–275.
/Filter /FlateDecode On Lewis's account, the actual world is special only in that we live there. Le Poidevin, R. (1988): Time and truth in fiction, Br. 30, 407–428. Subscription will auto renew annually. 32, pp. Lukasiewicz, J.
of the pure theory) in which the elements of the models are required to be possible (1991): Predication, fiction, and artificial intelligence, Topoi endobj J. Aesthet. (The problem posed by propositional attitude ascriptions)